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1. 
SocialJustice and Common Good 
What Are They For? 
Thomas Hughson, SJ 
There is beauty in this world and there are the humiliated. 
We must strive, as difficult as it may be, not to be unfaithful 
to either one. 
-ALBERT CAMus (PARAPHRASE) 
Are the categories social justice and common good an untroubled 
heritage or an obsolete disadvantage for the development of 
CST?! Does their silence on culture weaken them in the face of 
postmodern circumstances bringing the importance of cultures 
to the fore? Would an alternative formula such as sociocultural 
justice be preferable because it indicates a link with culture and 
more clearly implies a common good inclusive of a cultural di-
mension in and beyond social, economic, and political struc-
tures? Are they permanent, immobile residents in the lexicon of 
CST? Is there room in CST for conceiving and formulating the 
significance of culture in and fora just social order? 
Inquiry toward an answer will focus on a specific set of docu-
ments. The documents make up the literature of official papal 
and episcopal CST (collected in a volume such as O'Brien 
and Shannon's Catholic Social Thought), plus subsequent papal 
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encyclicals, statements from episcopal conferences, and the 
synchronic Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. 2 The 
aim is not an encyclopedic survey of documents or a distillation 
. of what can be proposed as basic themes but rather raising a 
plausible hypothesis about a missing element in CST. 
Testing basic terms and concepts in a given field of discourse 
can be fruitful for more reasons than conceptual precision that 
improves verbal definitions. In this case, problematizing the lan-
guage and conceptuality of social justice and the common good 
looks to their relationship with culture. Is there a link between 
the concepts of a common good owed to Aquinas and renewed 
after Leo XIII's Aeterni Patris and ambient cultures? Broaching 
this topic presupposes that almost eighty years of usage since 
Quadragesimo Anno have not so woven the language of social 
justice into CST that entertaining possible revision threatens 
to unravel the whole fabric. 
Terms at Issue 
In 1931 social justice was new to papal social teaching but had 
already appeared in the mid-nineteenth century from theolo-
gianLuigi Taparelli D'Azeglio.3 In 1937 Pius XI clarified social 
justice in Divini Redemptoris as pertaining, first of all, to the eco-
nomic order. Each individual, whether employer or worker, had 
an obligation to contribute to a common good in the economic 
realm. But making a contribution depended on the prior fact 
that, as Pius XI put it, "each individual in the dignity of his hu-
man personality is supplied with all that is necessary for the ex-
ercise of his social functions" (Divini Redemptoris, no. 51). The 
wealthy and powerful had means at their disposal that equipped 
them for "exercise of ... social functions." So emphasis fell on 
what would bring about conditions-a just wage, lessening un-
employment, decent working conditions, freedom to organize, 
reform or transformation of the economy to insure a propor-
tionate redistribution of wealth-enabling workers to exercise 
their social functions. 
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Social justice adapted Aquinas's idea of general justice, also 
called legal justice insofar as laws promote it, to modern condi-
tions. General justice concerned obligations to the common good 
of society incumbent on its individual members: "The virtue of 
a good citizen is general justice, whereby the person is directed 
to the common good."4 General or legal justice was about 
people's actions in relation to a common good, not just to each 
individual's good. What is the common good? According to 
Gaudium et Spes, the common good "embraces the sum of those 
conditions of social life by which individuals, families, and groups 
can achieve their own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and 
ready way" (no. 74). Contributing to and benefiting from these 
"conditions of social life" is a matter of general or social justice, 
which, like any kind of justice, is other directed.5 An orientation 
beyond an individual, family, or group to the common good can 
be immanent in all manner of virtuous acts, including distribu-
tive and commutative justice.6 Social justice, then, has the first 
and defining aspect of being an active contribution to the com-
mon good of temporal society.7 
Why disturb this language? Identifying the provenance of 
the question will clarify the direction of the reflection. Asking 
about the longevity of categories stems from commitment to 
CST and to a Christian social agenda. The question does not 
express aversion to movements, ideas, labors, initiatives, orga-
nizations, and people inside and outside the church seeking so-
cial justice. Far from it and to the contrary. Stating admiration 
for Scandinavian social democracies and for a social approach 
to democracy in Germany and France can prevent confusion 
between interrogating standard items in the vocabulary of CST 
and a retrograde resistance to the meanings and referents of 
social justice and common good. Still, why interrogate those 
items? Are they not doing just fine? Do they not stand more in 
need of popular communication, explanation, reception, and 
application than of theoretical reexamination? From what spe-
cific grounds does an interrogation arise? 
The starting point for a sense of something problematic, some 
doubts about the advisability of sustaining the language of social 
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justice and the common good, was conversation with two eminent 
professors. Both John Atherton, emeritus from the Department 
of Religions and Theology at the University of Manchester and 
former Canon Theologian of Manchester Cathedral, and 
George Newlands, emeritus dean of the Faculty of Divinity at 
the University of Glasgow, wondered, each in a distinct way 
and for different reasons, about a modem Christian social agenda 
continually formulated in the familiar vocabulary of social jus-
tice and common good. 
Professor Newlands wasn't sure about social justice and the 
common good as an axis for a wide, ecumenical social agenda. 
Instead, it might be more productive for theological reflection, 
in systematics too and not only in social ethics, to make a turn 
to human rights. The human rights agenda invites consensus 
across the churches, fosters dialogue with non-theological dis-
ciplines, and grounds cooperation between Christian and other 
groups dedicated to human rights. Systematic theology, in ad-
dition to Christian social ethic, can enrich Christian commit-
ment to human rights by expounding how human rights involve 
Christology and theological anthropology as premises. A turn 
to human rights can give new life and new language to a fa-
tigued social justice agenda.8 
Two themes threaded through Professor Atherton's doubts 
about social justice and the common good."9 One, taking account of 
Manchester as the epicenter of the Industrial Revolution, and 
within a framework of critical analysis of defects in capitalism 
and a proposal for transforming them, was a distancing from 
insufficient admission, whether by Britain's old and new Labor 
Party or by Christians committed to social justice, of material 
benefits from capitalism. The other was concern about dangers 
to minorities in advocating the common good as a basic prin-
ciple in a pluralistic society. Atherton shares this misgiving with 
Iris Marion Young, and both are close but not identical to John 
Rawls's liberal critique of a common good to which John 
Coleman has responded. 10 
The two professors' friendly doubts interrupted social jus-
tice language for a project I tentatively had tided "Christ and 
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Social Justice." Their unexpected views were welcome. They 
planted an interesting doubt. Eventually the question detached 
from the conversations and took on a life of its own, so that I am 
not seeking to reconstruct their views in order to reply to them 
but to answer a question they stimulated. 
Once embarked on reconsidering the language of CST, an-
other problem surfaced. Social justice had connotations in CST 
that it lacked when a topic for philosophy and the social sci-
ences. When the same terms mean different things in two dif-
ferent realms of discourse, equivocation occurs and communi-
cation fails. David Miller states, "In the writings of most 
contemporary political philosophers, social justice is regarded 
as an aspect of distributive justice."ll The editors of a recent, 
valuable anthology observe that "issues of social justice, in the 
broadest sense, arise when decisions affect the distribution of 
benefits and burdens between different individuals or groupS."12 
To be sure, benefits and burdens go beyond the economics into 
society and the political order. 
CST has a concept of social justice broader and subder in 
several respects. CST does not simply mcorporate the results of 
one or another academic discipline because it looks to what can 
be called the overall health of a society. Social health-whether 
flourishing or declining, serving its people well or ill-depends 
on a loosely coordinated but interrelated functioning of social, 
economic, cultural, religious, and political institutions. John 
Rawls called these the "major institutions" of a society, and des-
ignated their cumulative interaction the "basic structure" of a 
society.13 Social health is a society's basic structure in a condi-
tion of flourishing, gauged by the well-being of the most vul-
nerable, marginalized, and poor. The criteria and processes of 
distribution are at stake as well as the quality of the outcome in 
terms of the dignity and flourishing of the person. 
Finally, faith keeps the virtue of social justice with reference 
not only to moral values, norms, actions, virtues, and a just so-
cial order, but also to human dignity and the meaning of the 
human. And as with the whole of morality, faith locates social 
justice within the divinelhuman relationship. In fidelity to the 
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divinelhuman relationship, CST keeps conscience and knowl-
edge accountable to God, revelation, and lived faith in full re-
spect for the human and civil right to religious liberty. Reli-
gious liberty matters because in a pluralist society not all accept 
a tie between religion and social justice. 14 
Clearly, common good and social justice carry important, defen-
sible content that can be put into dialogue with other usages. 
However, interdisciplinary dialogue, dialogue among religious 
groups, and entry by faith-based groups into public life all would 
benefit from maximum clarity and agreement on terminology. 
The fact of different meanings in different discourses raises a 
question about formulation. Are the terms social justice and com-
mon good commonly understood in their variant meanings in 
different kinds of discourse? Might it be advisable and produc-
tive to find substitutes for these terms that could travel across 
discourses more easily? Pius IX had no qualms about leaving 
behind Aquinas's "general justice" by introducing "social jus-
tice." 
From these several kinds of misgivings emerges a larger prob-
lematic that goes beyond the language of CST. Has CST taken 
adequate account of cultural context generally, and in particular 
has CST opened its invaluable content to theories and under-
standings of culture? For the sake of discussion, then, I propose 
that social justice and the common good be put into the position of 
being under reexamination to see whether they helpfully meet 
new conditions. A maximum or a minimum outcome is pos-
sible. A maximum conclusion will be to modify, revise, or aban-
don the language of social justice and common good. A mini-
mal conclusion will be to retain the familiar language with new 
insistence on its inseparability from culture. 
Public Theology 
Of course; political and liberation theologies already have coined 
new descriptive and normative languages for much of what CST 
promotes under headings of social justice and common good. 
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And yet, beside liberation and political theologies another ecu-
menically potent current of social theology has emerged, a de-
scendant of practical theology called public theology.15 Public 
theology has absorbed an option for the poor from liberation 
theology and engages in socio-critical analysis somewhat in line 
with political theology,16 and like them, public theology too con-
siders privatized religion an unacceptable status quo. Public the-
ology also typically proceeds on the principle of a conditional, 
critical, continually examined grant of legitimacy to both de-
mocracy and capitalism.17 Its goal is authentic and effective 
Christian participation in a democratic polity in the situation of 
a predominantly middle-class economy. 
Contrarily, two schools of thought, Radical Orthodoxy, asso-
ciated with John Milbank, and perspectives championed by 
Stanley Hauerwas, object strenuously to any such grant of le-
gitimacy to modern nation-states and so renounce public theol-
ogy. The critique extends all the way to protesting the distinc-
tion and priority of civil society to the state. William T. 
Cavanaugh from the Hauerwas school abhors the fact that "'po-
litical theology' and 'public theology' have assumed the legiti-
macy of the separation of the state from civil society, and tried 
to situate the Church as one more interest group within civil 
society."18 This line of thought has something but not every-
thing to contribute in dialectical tension with public-theologi-
cal endorsing of, for example, laws, institutions, and policies 
protective of the human and civil right to liberty in matters of 
religion, and with seeking the reform not the eradication of capi-
talism. 
Kenneth and Michael Himes quote David Hollenbach's well-
received statement that public theology represents an "effort to 
discover and communicate the socially significant meanings of 
Christian symbols and tradition" in the form of "theological 
reflection which examines the resources latent within the Chris-
tian tradition for understanding the church's public role."19 In 
succinct fashion the Himeses confirm that "public theology 
wants to bring the wisdom of the Christian tradition into public 
conversation to contribute to the well-being of the society."20 
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"Public theology," states Lutheran theologian Robert Benne, 
"refers ... to the engagement of a living religious tradition with its 
public environment-...:..the economic, political, and cultural spheres 
of our common life."21 Benne explains that a religious tradition's 
knowledge "interprets the public world in the light of the reli-
gious tradition. It may be used to persuade the world of the co-
gency of its vision of how things ought to be in the public spheres 
oflife."22 "An important way in which churches (as distinguished 
from individual bishops, pastors and lay leaders) engage in pub-
lic theology is by publishing or in some other manner commu-
nicating their distinctive, official positions on public matters."23 
CST, irreducible to social ethics, belongs to this mode of 
public theology by which a church tradition interprets the pub-
lic world. Contrarily, Benne as an individual academic theolo-
gian puts the highest priority not on church teaching about public 
matters but on individuals forming their own personal responses 
instructed by participation in word and sacrament without ref-
erence to official statements, public positions, and policies such 
as CST. 
Theologians have taken up public theology in reference to 
facts, interpretations, practices, and theories that start at regional 
levels yet have a scope that opens to national and international 
realities.24 The concerns of public theology in the modes of both 
church teaching and academic theology inspire the ensuing dis-
cussion of CST. It has to be admitted that only a few efforts in 
academic public theology have addressed the reality of cultures. 25 
By and large, public theology from individual theologians no 
less than CST has focused on social practice. 
Critical review of social justice and common good with an 
eye to culture will be an indispensable consideration for CST 
on one condition. That condition has to do with emergent real-
izations of how economic, political, and social structures involve 
a people's culture.26 Insofar as the traditional social question on 
the ground has been changing in the direction of a higher pri-
ority for culture, to that extent CST has to take greater theo-
retical account of culture, even to the point of reexamining fa-
miliar CST vocabulary. 
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Though not the only factor raising the profile of culture, 
thought about economic globalization involves practical and 
theoretical attention to many cultures touched by globalization. 
Globalization, a topic on the agenda of CST, stirs an interest in 
cultures insofar as mobility of capital, technology, labor, and 
ideals affects local mores, traditional relationships, and world 
viewsY I agree with Kenneth Himes that to counteract a false 
universalism built into globalization CST must "shift its focus: 
whereas in the past CST had been primarily directed at issues 
of economics and secondarily of politics, the new context of glo-
balization will force the tradition more to issues of culture and 
identity."28 At the same time, I do not think the issue of culture 
can be tied to the question of cultural identity for persons, groups, 
or a society except on the premise that identity can be mixed, 
and need not be "pure." 
Then too, pluralist societies increasingly pose the problem 
of some members, groups, or nations that are being excluded 
from access to full participation in economic and political life 
because cultural differences predefine and pre-position them as 
marginalized, as second-class citizens. Benedict XVI's Caritas in 
Veritate speaks about international development facing "the pros-
pect of a world in need of profound cultural renewal" (no. 21) 
and recognizes that there are "immaterial or cultural causes of 
development and underdevelopment" (no. 22). 
Marginalization also flows from racism. Postulating several 
races distinguished by skin color and a few facial features is a 
cultural habit of perception, not biological, genetic fact. Racism 
is a cultural bias that blocks full access to participation in social, 
economic, and political life. 29 A society cannot then receive the 
contribution from a racial minority to economic and political 
life. But access to an economy and to citizenship does not nec-
essarily eradicate racism, because racism infects a culture first 
of all. Overcoming assignment of some members of a society to 
second-class citizenship because of perceived cultural apprehen-
sion of racial differences involves changes in culture, not just 
adjustments in economic, social, and political institutions. The 
Pontifical Council of Justice and Peace adverts to a cultural 
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dimension in racism in referring to a partial remedy, education 
that belongs to the realm of culture.30 
May it not be timely to think about revising or moving be-
yond social justice and the common good as if they were sepa-
rate from cultures? One alternative, without discarding distinc-
tions among the economy, social cohesion, and political 
institutions, is to envision a flourishing culture as part of the 
goal for which a just social order exists. Culture is that for whose 
sake social justice is sought. A just social order is the means, a 
people flourishing in their cultural activities is the end.31 Begin-
ning in prayerful gratitude for CST supports projecting a pos-
sible line of its development. Comparison of that possibility with 
postconciliar CST begets ideas and judgments with a critical 
edge. Critical is not hostile. Nonetheless, respect for transpar-
ency advises setting forth a guiding hermeneutical principle. 
From Above or from Below? 
CST has drawn upon scripture, tradition, reason, and historical 
experience in developing an ongoing, faith-based response to 
the modern "social question" broadly understood. Paul Misner 
and Marvin Krier Mich, among others, have detailed the his-
torically knowable contribution of a multitude of local pastoral 
and lay initiatives to the emergence of CST, at least since Rerum 
Novarum. 32 As Lonergan observes, the good is always concrete. 
I infer that this means the social good is also local, grassroots, 
historically situated, and if formulated, then in a given language. 
Like the good and the social good, so too suffering is always 
concrete, in all people to some extent, yet at times more griev-
ous in some individuals and groups with names and addresses. 
Not surprisingly, then, "social Catholicism" has taken its rise in 
response to human suffering of various kinds and has generated 
organized local lay and pastoral initiatives in the church's 
grassroots. 
Consequendy, there is reason to agree withJohn Coleman in 
approving Gordon Zahn's proposal that the official writings of 
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CST, including postconciliar CST, be read "from below" as re-
sponses to prior Catholic social movements, and I would add 
again, as responses to peoples' suffering, which evoked the move-
ments in the first place.33 Yet, and noting Coleman's refusal to 
dismiss CST,34 there also is reason to think that CST documents 
published "from above," besides whatever original theoretical 
or pastoral thought they add to content "from below," also con-
tain three new meanings that have to do less with how CST 
comes about than with its role and impact in the church.35 Sup-
posing the extreme that all content in CST came from prior 
social movements so that papal and episcopal CST simply rati-
fied material "from below," even then the three new meanings 
would justify reading CST "from above" as well as "from be-
low." 
One new dimension of meaning has to do with further test-
ing of various local, regional, or national movements against 
the background of the whole international church seen "from 
above" and in light of a practical tie to the tradition of apostolic 
authority. Official approval of ideas and practical orientations 
originating "from below" lends increased credibility to their 
positive connection with the word of God, the Holy Spirit, scrip-
ture, tradition, and reason. Papal and episcopal CST, not always 
a main source of new ideas, exercises a maximum degree of re-
sponsibility for conserving the heritage of gospel faith and 
ecclesial structures so that what survives testing can be widely 
and confidently received throughout the church as valid appro-
priation and application of scripture and tradition. 
Somewhat similarly, during Vatican II the worldwide episco-
pacy as well as popes John XXIII and Paul VI tested and ap-
proved the direction of liturgical, biblical, and lay apostolic re-
newals already under way. Conciliar debates and votes of approval 
for the documents incorporated some already developed theo-
logical themes. The prior initiatives and theological perspec-
tives thereby came onto a new level of authorization "from 
above" that approximated (at least in principle) a panoptic ap-
preciation for insights arising in many local churches, peoples, 
nations, languages, cultural contexts, and emergent situations 
--
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in the whole, international church. The episcopate and the 
Petrine office carried out what is a little like an official (from 
above) substantiating of what (from below) had been a strong 
working hypothesis. 
What also accrues to content received "from below" is par-
ticipation in what Bernard Lonergan designated an "effective 
function of meaning."36 The sources of meaning are all con-
scious acts and their intended contents, both transcendental and 
categorical. Meaning is often associated with symbols and in-
terpretations, ideas and definitions, values and decisions, truths 
and history. Lonergan distinguishes an effective from a cogni-
tive function of meaning. Effective meaning is operative not 
explanatory; it is not primarily a grasp of intelligibility, a judg-
ment of truth, or an appreciation of a good. 
Effective meaning resides in intelligent directives, commands, 
persuasion, and coordination of human activities whether, for 
example, by CEOs and shift foremen of mining companies, po-
liticalleaders at all levels, producers and directors of films and 
plays, the chief engineer on a construction project, or the pilot 
of an airliner. Authorized directives guide cooperative actions 
toward agreed purposes not attainable without coordinated ac-
tivity by many individuals. The communication of directives does 
not occur in grunts and idiosyncratic gestures but in words and 
physical expressions functioning as carriers of common mean-
ing that function toward producing economic, civic, and politi-
cal effects from human work. Work is "meaning-full" activity. 
There is meaning apart from theory, proposition, and defini-
tion. 
An emergency situation illuminates the distinction between 
cognitive and effective functions of meaning. The captain of a 
fire brigade on the scene of a blazing apartment house coordi-
nates and directs actions among trained firefighters toward the 
socially agreed, foreknown purposes of saving lives and extin-
guishing the conflagration. WIthout exercise of directive au-
thority by the on-site captain, each firefighter could well act 
according to a different plan, or none, for rescuing the resi-
dents and fighting the fire. Under pressures of time, seeking a 
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consensus or a multiplicity of uncoordinated efforts would spell 
disaster. So there has to be someone in charge to coordinate the 
whole effort. The captain is the one who strategizes and de-
ploys the resources. 
The resources include technology. Now the captain mayor 
may not grasp the physics and chemistry in the diffusion of 
heated gases and the rates of oxidation in various building ma-
terials. The degree of scientific comprehension will not matter 
apart from training and experience. It is enough that the cap-
tain knows how to put personnel and material resources to the 
best use. That too belongs to cognitive meaning. The act of 
communicating directives and work carried out according to 
them are meaning in a primarily effective function that mani-
fests practical intelligence. Putting theoretical and practical cog-
nitive meaning to work invests communicating directives and 
the work with effective meaning. Communicating the directives 
and the work are meaningful human activities whose full intel-
ligibility does not reduce to prior ingredients. Meaning func-
tions effectively in the captain's communicating of directives and 
in the organized activities they guide. 
By analogy, CST receives prior content "from below," like 
the fire captain's prior theoretical and practical knowledge from 
sources beyond himself. When CST subsumes and communi-
cates preexisting content in publication "from above," then the 
ideas and practical orientations "from below" are drawn into an 
effective function of meaning apart from any new cognitive 
meaning a pope or his writing assistant may add, which again 
may be substantial. The summing up, arranging, and commu-
nicating of content "from below" invests it with new effective 
meaning. It has become meaning operative in an authoritative 
guiding influence, somewhat like effective meaning in a fire 
captain's communication to fire fighters directing and coordi-
nating their efforts. Content that had been cognitive and lo-
cally effective meaning enters into an internationally effective 
function of meaning. 
Now, adding an effective function of meaning in CST to pa-
pal verification of authenticity to Christian sources results in a 
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reevaluation of supposing an antagonism defines the difference 
between reading "from above" and "from below." Instead, nei-
ther vantage point excludes the other. They differ and generate 
varying perspectives but are not locked into irreconcilable con-
flict. They can be conceived as two interpretative perspectives 
on CST derived from differing positions within the church as 
institution. Tension, not contradiction, characterizes their co-
possibility as situated modes of attention to CST. A dialectic 
obtains not a synthesis but contraries able to be complemen-
tary. Reading from both vantage points sets in motion an inter-
action between local or regional origins "from below" and in-
ternational reception of CST "from above." 
CST and Culture 
Arguably theology is undergoing a turn to culture.37 To what 
has theology been turning? What, that is, has CST been ignor-
ing? A definition of culture represents an option among alter-
natives. The church at Vatican II, the academy, and individual 
theologians have jettisoned a classicist ideal of culture as one 
timeless universal achievement in the Christian West that serves 
as a normative gauge for degrees of human realization by which 
to measure all other societies and cultures in all eras and places. 
In this view the evolved West is the future of all peoples, the 
end of their progress and the end of histories. That ideal and 
definition are no longer an option for the church, CST, or the-
ology. 
By contrast, a typically modern or empirical idea of culture 
comes from anthropology, has footings in observation and re-
search, differentiates culture from nature, sees a culture as hu-
manly constructed, varying from one bounded social group to 
another, embracing the totality of a group's way oflife, and shap-
ing members of that group. A culture is a synchronic, unitary 
whole of interrelated parts guided by the "meaning dimension 
of social life" that forms social behaviors and produces a social 
order on the basis of "a community of meaning."38 Staking no 
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claim to the universal normativity of any culture, yet presup-
posing a common humanity able to be disengaged from the 
weight of a heritage or tradition,39 this idea is an option. 
At Vatican II the church made an option for this ideal and 
definition. The option was not out of the blue. Sporadic remote 
preparation took place in the form of new insights on evange-
lizing. For example, a 1659 directive from the Congregation 
for the Propagation of the Faith had urged bishops in China 
not to import France, Spain, or Italy, just the faith. 40 That ap-
preciation of a difference between faith and a European nation's 
reception of it broadened to become the principle of not iden-
tifying the gospel with Western cultures. The eighteenth-
century distinction and ensuing practices opened a Western door 
to the spiritual giftedness of non-Western cultures and religions, 
eventually evident in Vatican II's Nostra Aetate. 
More proximate to Vatican II, Allen Figueroa Deck points 
out, popes from Leo XIII to Pius XII were the very portals 
through which an anthropological concept of culture entered 
Catholic social thoughtY Vatican II firmly held to a modem 
idea of culture. For instance, Gaudium et Spes commented that 
in cultures, "different styles of living and different scales of val-
ues originate in different ways of using things, of working and 
self-expression, of practicing religion and of behavior, of devel-
oping science and the arts, and of cultivating beauty" (no. 53). 
Figueroa Deck judges that Vatican II made an anthropological 
concept of culture the "integrating or architectonic principle 
for understanding the church's mission and social teaching to-
day."42 Paul VI's Evangelii Nuntiandi and John Paul II's 
Redemptoris Missio, as well as postconciliar theologies of mission 
bear out this assessment.43 Inculturation of the gospel in each 
cultural context, in light of a modem idea of culture, became a 
theological mainstay. 
For example, in discussing inculturation Marcello De 
Carvalho Azevedo exemplifies a postconciliar option for the 
modem idea of culture. Culture, he states, is "the set of mean-
ings, values, and patterns which underlie the perceptible phe-
nomena of a concrete society, whether they are recognizable on 
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the level of social practice ... or whether they are carriers of 
signs, symbols, meanings and representations, conceptions and 
feelings that consciously or unconsciously pass from generation 
to generation."44 Social practice here includes material culture 
and technology, along with social, economic, and political ac-
tivities. 
His analysis of culture began to go beyond the absence of 
historical process in the modern idea of culture by describing 
signs, meanings, feelings, and concepts transmitted from one 
generation to the next. His idea of culture had merit, and I 
worked with it in a 1993 discussion of social justice as cultural 
change.45 But there are limits to the modern concept of culture, 
and subsequent critiques have expanded on them to the point of 
advancing a more complicated, postmodern notion of culture(s) 
that leaves the theological ideal of inculturation in a condition 
as problematic as an unqualified modern idea of culture has be-
come. 
The modern, anthropological idea of culture was, critiques 
pointed out, inattentive to historical process; conceived a cul-
ture as an unchanging, internally consistent whole; presumed a 
consensus on it within it; ignored human agency in how a cul-
ture was socially regulative; and treated each culture as a self-
contained social monad ideally impervious to influences from 
other cultures.46 The postmodern anthropological idea compli-
cates the modern idea by closer and more detailed reference to 
historical processes. In each culture contentious, heterogeneous, 
decentralized, internally contradictory ideals, meanings, and 
practices continually shift in degrees of consolidation and inter-
act with other cultures. 
Negotiating meanings involves a struggle for power but not 
necessarily coercionY The personal and social result is that cul-
tural identity has been conceived as a "hybrid, relational affair, 
something that lives between as much ;is within cultures."48 Cre-
oles, exiles, expatriates, and mestizos/as become exemplars of this 
kind of cultural identity.49 "Pure" identities are not suspect, are 
not received as necessarily descriptive or normative. Cultural 
and personal identities can be too solid, too fixed, too complete, 
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over-determined by memories, functioning 'as negations of oth-
ers. Postmodern ideas on culture dissolve an assumption that an 
educated elite can define its culture for everyone, once and for 
alPo Along with suspicion about a clear, solid definition of a 
"pure" identity in any culture comes respect for sometimes messy, 
vulgar, often inspired popular culture as a primary zone in which 
faith and a culture meet.51 
Analyses 
Nevertheless a distinction made by Azevedo and by Lonergan 
too deserves continued acceptance despite trailing a modern ideal 
of culture. Each distinguishes two levels or components in a 
culture. The two levels are not a class-based division between 
an aristocracy and commoners, proles and an elite, but a func-
tion-based differentiation. The first level or component con-
sists in people's activities participating in the everyday opera-
tion of the main institutions (economy, state, family, schools, 
and so on) of a society. Azevedo calls these activities "social prac-
tice," and I will keep this phrase. Social practice is where social 
justice does or does not come to personal and public structural 
realization. 
Still, Bernard Lonergan offers an understanding of the sec-
ond level of a culture better able to understand social justice not 
only embedded in social practice but also in front of it as a goal. 
"In front of" means the world projected by affirmation of social 
justice and the common good, and more broadly by CST. The 
second level of culture, the reflexive component, lies beyond 
and in front of attainment of social justice. 
Lonergan analyzes culture as the common meanings of a so-
ciety as a continual resultant from a communicative process that 
arises in common experience. However, interfering group bi-
ases, organized obtuseness, and other obstacles beset the inter-
play in and between each of these steps so that nothing is auto-
matic. To the contrary, cultural common meanings exist only in a 
contentious dialectic between progress and decline. 52 Common 
meanings constitutive of a society are not a fixed, permanent set 
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whose only historical dynamism is to pass from generation to 
generation. Instead, a culture is common meanings in constant 
circulation from personal and historical experience of major and 
minor events that may be celebrated in song, all the way to col-
lective decisions that mark turning points, and then back again 
to experience, halting often to assimilate whatever historical 
events (for example, the end of an empire) intervene to chal-
lenge common societal self-understandings previously held (for 
example, Western classicism, non-Western subalternity). 
True, Lonergan sometimes describes common meaning as if 
there is a settled consensus within a group or society and in that 
respect has a modern idea of culture. 53 However his larger analy-
sis of meaning releases his idea of culture from modern limits. 
He treats meaning as a dynamic, historically contingent process 
with plenty of conflicting elements that are fodder for the 
method of a theological specialty he names dialectic. His atten-
tion to the complex nature and historically concrete dialectic in 
the common meaning that constitutes any society's culture gives 
Lonergan's account affinity with postmodern ideas of culture as 
a contested, internally diversified process of producing and cir-
culating meanings within any group, society, or subculture. 
Like Azevedo, Lonergan divides culture into two elements. 
The first coincides with Azevedo's "social practice," conceived 
as sets of common meanings, values, images, commitments, and 
motives operative in a particular people's ordinary social, eco-
nomic, political, and technological activities. Lonergan parts 
company over the second level or component of culture, which 
does not coincide with Azevedo's "signs, symbols, meanings and 
representations ... that pass from generation to generation." 
Lonergan includes "scientific, scholarly, philosophic and theo-
logical understanding of the everyday."54 This is the reflexive 
level of culture inhabited by the natural and social sciences, phi-
losophy, humane letters, history, and critical studies of all sorts. 
Humane learning, the sciences, philosophy, and critical studies 
of everyday meanings and values occur on the reflexive level. 
This seems to be the locale of the fine arts too. 
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Azevedo captures well the difference between social practice 
and the rest of a folk culture, but his second level of culture does 
not deal adequately with whatever exceeds folkways or a com-
mon-sense heritage. So I will adopt Lonergan's "reflexive cul-
ture" as the second level of a culture, keeping Azevedo's "social 
practice" for the first. 
Robert Doran emphasizes interaction between the two lev-
els or components of culture, everyday social practice and re-
flexive culture. 55 His account of culture proceeds from 
Lonergan's integral scale of ascending values: vital, social, cul-
tural, personal, religious.56 Personal, cultural, and social values 
are realized in a tension between two poles. The personal sub-
ject exists and develops in dialectic between the limits of neural 
exigencies and self-transcendence in modes of intentional con-
sciousness. Culture exists and develops in dialectic between con-
stitutive cosmological and anthropological meanings. Society 
as community exists and progresses in a dialectical tension be-
tween intersubjective spontaneity and the acts and products of 
practical intelligence. The social order, economy, and political 
organization of a society come from practical intelligence. 
Society's everyday operations, shaped by more and less social 
and distributive justice in providing conditions within which 
people can attain vital values (nutrition, clothing, shelter, health, 
vigor, and a capacity for physical action), are infused with cul-
tural meanings. The culturally infused social operations are cul-
ture as social practice. Social practice is culture as operative, con-
stituting, embodied, inherited, and taken for granted in acts and 
structures of a social, economic, technological, and political sort. 
How can social practice be shaped by and then come to em-
body social justice? Doran notes that the reflexive level of a cul-
ture can influence cultural meanings operative in social prac-
tice. In fact, a crucial nexus obtains between social practice and 
reflexive culture. Changing social practice toward a more just 
order depends significantly on meanings from the reflexive level 
of culture entering into the polity. One sort of influence on social 
practice that reverses unjust conditions comes from "prolonged 
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and difficult theoretical and scientific work."57 But only a culti-
vated interiority can maintain a creative tension between prac-
ticality and intersubjective spontaneity essential to a successful 
social order. A flourishing society has a communal integrity, the 
outcome of suppressing neither practical intelligence (political, 
economic, technological) nor intersubjective spontaneity 
(friends, family, neighbors, groups with common interests) but 
keeping both alive and interactive at the same time. The reflex-
ive level of a culture tends to subvert ethnocentrism and nation-
alism that can be carried along and instantiated in practicality 
and intersubjective spontaneity. 
Applying Doran's analysis, social justice pertains to practical 
intelligence as the source and sustenance of institutions and 
structures. Aioreove~ the 
cultural values in general of a healthy society are consti-
tuted by the operative assumptions resulting from the pur-
suit of the transcendental objectives of the human spirit: 
of the beautiful in story and song, ritual and dance, art and 
literature; of the intelligible in science, scholarship, and 
common sense; of the true in philosophy and theology; 
and of the good in all questions regarding normativity.58 
The cultural values, the operative assumptions, and their origin 
in human self-transcendence are present in social practice and 
on the reflexive level of culture. 
Aiembers of a society active on the reflexive level originate 
the interpretative perspectives, critical standards, new ideas, and 
future prospects that lead to reshaping the structural products 
of practical intelligence. For social practice to become socially 
just, then, may well and on a case-by-case basis depend on keep-
ing practical intelligence in economic activities, political activi-
ties, use of technology, and social interactions open to theoreti-
cal, artistic, scientific, philosophical, theological meanings 
flowing from freedom, autonomy in inquiry, and creativity on 
the reflexive level of culture. This allows practical intelligence 
to stay actively in tension with intersubjective spontaneity with-
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out overwhelming it. From time to time one task of practical 
intelligence in its political office is to mediate these reflexive 
meanings into the polity to shape policies that affect the economy 
and the use of technology. 
So a first step in social analysis is to see how open the acts and 
products of practical intelligence are to meanings from reflex-
ive culture. Checking practicality on whether it is open or closed 
represents an indirect, long-term approach to social justice that 
underscores the essential role of culture, especially reflexive 
culture, in a society's common good. A society that has given 
over its social order, its social practice, so completely to a closed 
practicality and so to a predominandy instrumental oudook, will 
not be moved easily, if at all, to regard as a valid goal persons, 
their well-being, and the structures that foster well-being for all 
members of society. 
There is a possible hyper-pragmatic blindness that inverts 
right order by seeing and acting as if the economy and polity 
ought to be served rather than serve, since persons and their 
well-being already have been predefined as means instrumental 
to practical ends such as producing and consuming as, it would 
be thought, legitimately manipulated citizens. In such a condi-
tion reflexive culture is marginalized and deprived of public in-
fluence. 
Then art, philosophy, and theology along with the natural 
and social sciences, humane learning, and scholarship are all 
measured, for example, exclusively by their utility to the opera-
tions of a free-market economy and democratic polity. To the 
extent that this sort of situation prevails, to that extent advocacy 
of a just social order involves clarifying the danger of allowing 
market forces to be understood as if they were processes as natu-
ral, inalterable, and universal as gravity. 
However, Doran's analytic concepts need one clarification. 
His concept of practicality seems to be equivalent to instrumental 
reason, techne, its products, and attainments. 59 Practicality, he 
points out, needs to be receptive to theory and reflexive culture 
because intentional consciousness also has to do with intelligibil-
ity, value, truth, beauty, and the whole human good. But beyond 
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that valid point it needs to be said that the nature of practicality 
also encompasses what traditionally was designated phronesis 
(prudence) and poesis (art). Canny prudential judgments expressed 
in attitudes and sayings, creativity in artisanal crafts, popular art, 
and music belong to what Lonergan and Doran identify as 
intersubjectivity in tension with instrumental reason.60 They lo-
cate acts and outcomes from phronesis and poesis in intersubjective 
spontaneity not in practicality. But just that locating seems to me 
to surrender practicality to instrumental reason by accepting an 
exclusion of phronesis and poesis from practicality. 
Practicality, then, has its own internal dimensions beyond 
instrumental reason and has its own source of spontaneity. That 
slight adjustment in the meaning of practicality allows locating 
the point of origin for what the field of cultural studies calls 
popular culture in practicality. Popular culture is not folk cul-
ture. The milieu and communication of popular culture are mass 
media, not generation-to-generation tradition. This means that 
hopes for advancing more just social practice have to listen to, 
take account of, and learn from popular culture as well as from 
reflexive culture. Instrumental reason as practicality also has to 
come to respect ideas, values, and feelings expressed by phronesis 
and poesis in popular culture. 
That clarification of Doran's analysis permits refinement of 
the inquiry up to this point. CST by and large has ignored how 
movement toward just social practice depends on two factors, 
reflexive culture "from above" and popular culture "from within" 
practicality. Social practice is where social justice comes to real-
ization. Yet CST considers neither the reflexive level of culture 
nor popular culture as potential sources of change toward social 
justice. The humanism espoused by CST holds a still vacant 
place for reflexive culture, it is true, but less clearly for popular 
culture. 
Observations 
A first observation comes in the form of grateful recognition 
that in promoting social justice and a common good, CST 
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consistently has taught about culture as social practice, albeit 
without adverting to this as a mode of culture. At the same time, 
CST and Catholic thought generally have not addressed the 
idea and reality of cultural postmodernity extensively because 
of preoccupation with affirming religious transcendence in in-
tegral humanism and integral development. 
What does it mean and why is it important to point out that 
CST ignores the cultural dimension of social practice, reflexive 
culture, and popular culture? That is, it is not enough that 
Paul VI, John Paul II, and Benedict XVI steadfastly have pro-
tested against understanding the human person and the devel-
opment of peoples (progressio) in terms purely of economic and 
political structures justly arranged.61 The protest implies prior 
affirmation of ulterior human dimensions. Yet typically, refer-
ence to the ulterior dimensions has taken the form of a defining 
and irreplaceable witness to religion, apart from discussion of 
the reflexive level of culture or of popular culture. The reflexive 
level, not to mention popular culture, plays, for example, but a 
relatively minor role in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of 
the Church.62 
True, the Compendium as a whole presents many principles 
supportive of a just social order as embodying cultural mean-
ings and of reflexive culture as fulfillment of a just social prac-
tice. For example, there is a central affirmation of the dignity of 
the human person, a starting point in "integral and solidary 
humanism";63 a reference to Paul VI's idea of "development" as 
having an important cultural dimension;64 attention to the hu-
man person;65 and recognition that culture involves the "inte-
gral perfection of the person and the good of the whole of soci-
ety."66 Culture turns up in the Compendium as a basic dimension 
of human social existence, but science, art, and humane learn-
ing are situated in perspectives of evangelizing strategies, of re-
futing philosophical errors, and of correcting ethical shortcom-
ings. 
There is little or no celebration of unpredictable creativity 
and no engagement with postmodern cultural conditions of plu-
ralism internal to most societies. Culture emerges as a troubling 
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realm not fully identical with economic, political, and social life 
that somehow is indivisible from those dimensions. Neverthe-
less, the Compendium hints at a larger intuition about the im-
portance of the symbolic part of reflexive culture for CST. A 
full-color photographic reproduction of Ambrogio Lorenzatti's 
1338-39 Allegory of Good Government graces the front, spine, 
and back of the volume.67 Might the maxim against judging a 
book by its cover be ignored in this case? 
Social Catholicism in the form ofliberation theology has not 
ignored cultural contexts and world views in addressing the situ-
ation of the poor, or that political theology did not arise from, 
address, and develop theoretical antidotes to a contextual prob-
lem of authoritarianism. These and other currents "from be-
low" aside, CST "from above," with notable exceptions in Asian 
and African bishops' conferences, has not advanced too far in 
elucidating how a just social order embodies and also provides 
support for a particular culture, particularly the reflexive com-
ponent. Postconciliar CST has attended to culture as social prac-
tice but not much to a just social practice as embodying cultural 
meanings and even less in reference to reflexive culture or popu-
lar culture. More common is a binary contrast between those 
who exalt immanent economic, political, and social realities and 
the church's defense of a transcendent, constitutive human re-
lationship with God. The only absence CST usually points to 
in secular discussions and plans for social, political, and eco-
nomic development is an absence of religion due to a closed and 
truncated secularism that denies human and divine transcen-
dence. There seems to be no intrinsic reason why CST may not 
initiate analysis and discussion on the cultural finality inherent 
in social, political, and economic social practice. 
Finality toward Retlexive CUlture 
Finality is an immanent tendency toward an end, goal, or out-
come that completes and perfects whatever has the tendency. In 
an Aristotelian four-cause analysis, that end or outcome is the 
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final cause in addition to material, efficient, and formal causes 
of an entity's natural activities that express what it is. A society 
can be thought of as enough like an entity to bear the asking of 
a question about what it is for, to what does it tend, what is its 
final cause? And a commonly accepted answer in CST is that 
the finality of a society lies in the flourishing of its members as 
persons. Social justice and common good in a society are not 
entities but states of affairs, institutional arrangements, and quali-
tative ingredients of a society. So social justice and the common 
good share in a society's finality toward the human flourishing 
of its members. 
But social injustice in the day-to-day operation of institu-
tional arrangements prevents that flourishing for all or some. 
Accordingly, social justice measured by the common good shares 
in and promotes the end of a society, which is the flourishing of 
its members. This means that social justice and the common 
good are not complete ends in themselves, though to be achieved 
they must be sought. Yet they remain intermediate to an end 
beyond themselves that they do not and cannot produce. They 
have society's end, human flourishing, as their final cause, so 
they have a finality in fostering and tending toward that social 
goal. 
Consequendy, discussion now shifts to what could be called a 
modified eudemonistic perspective on social justice and the com-
mon good. The reason for shifting is to highlight incomplete-
ness in social justice and a common good taken by themselves as 
if comprising a self-contained agenda. Both are for something 
beyond themselves, human flourishing, or to use a phrase pre-
ferred by Atherton, "human well-being," or a phrase from Pope 
Benedict XVI's Caritas in Veritate, "transcendental humanism." 
Social justice and a common good are part of that picture, not 
the whole of it. 
Now, a eudemonistic ethic attends to the way choices mold a 
person or society. Besides a direct object in matters external to 
the person or society, choosing has an interior effect in forming 
an individual or a social character. To act in accord with social 
justice, to participate in the major institutions of a society, to 
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promote a common good that makes a contribution possible 
from all-these result in an individual's habit of justice and in a 
society having a shared ethos of social justice. This interior ef-
fect correlates with external effects in the public life of a society. 
The interior effect is the eudemonistic aspect of social justice 
and the common good. Social justice, like any virtue, can be 
appreciated as its own reward insofar as persons becoming so-
cially just persons participate in a just social order that fulfills a 
person's and a society's capacity to become and to be just. 
Modification of this perspective consists in emphasizing that 
the virtue of social justice prepares for further modes of virtue 
and a range of public effects above and beyond the economic 
and the political. Those capacities, modes, and effects lie in the 
realm of culture, above all in reflexive culture. Artists, poets, 
playwrights, novelists, musicians, academic specialists and teach-
ers, researchers, scientists, philosophers, the best journalists all 
exemplify this range of further, cultural effects. A modified 
eudemonistic ethic looks to intrinsic connections between prac-
tices and institutions realizing the virtue of social justice and 
activities of a cultural sort. This pertains both to those whose 
commitment to solidarity leads them to promote social justice 
likely to benefit others more than themselves and those seeking 
social justice as redress for their own suffering. 
Those bringing about justice find in a just economic and po-
litical order not the fullness of life but a platform for cultural 
activity, starting with family life, friendships, neighbors, educa-
tion, and in some societies a folk culture. Their exercise of so-
cial justice through participation in the main institutions of a 
society opens onto broader and deeper realizations of their own 
and others' human existence and dignity. Social justice under-
lies and facilitates but is not the substance of those further real-
izations. This is all to say that access by the poor, marginalized, 
and vulnerable to participation in economic, social, and politi-
cal life-a goal or end of social justice-is not an end in itself. 
Nor is a character formed in social justice a complete, self-suffi-
cient point of human arrival. Access to and growth in culture is 
part of what justice serves but cannot produce. 
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Conclusion 
Social justice in social practice is not a complete end in itself but 
is a way station to fuller individual and social self-realization. Of 
course, social justice cannot be a means if it has not first been an 
end sought and attained to some degree. But all social practice 
and no reflexive culture would have made even Jesus in his hu-
manity a dull boy, not the vibrant, topical,attractive, liberating, 
and whole-making public figure to whom the New Testament 
bears witness. Social justice is a means toward cultural creativity 
in and beyond economic activities. That finality belongs to so-
cial justice as an inner momentum toward humane living char-
acterized by being more than having (though having enough 
allows for fuller realization of being). 
Nor is a society's "common good" an end in itself. Asubstan-
tive, effective, and normative common good remains a set of 
conditions ("the sum total of social conditions which allow 
people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfill-
ment more fully and more readily"68) facilitating but not auto-
matically producing people's exercise of personal freedom in 
cultural creativity and a humane life. The Catechism of the Catholic 
Church teaches that the common good "should make accessible 
to each, what is needed to lead a truly human life: food, cloth-
ing, health, work, education, culture, and so on" (no. 1908).69 
Culture at the level of both social practice and reflexive culture 
belongs to the common good of a societyJo This is an important 
affirmation of education and culture over and above food, cloth-
ing, health, and work. Apparently, the Catechism distinguishes 
social practice (food, clothing, health, and work) from the re-
flexive level of culture (education and culture) and does not re-
fer to popular culture. The distinction has not incited further 
teaching on influence from the reflexive part of culture on so-
cial practice. 
The Compendium explains that the common good is not an 
"end in itself; it has value only in reference to attaining the ulti-
mate ends of the person and the universal common good of the 
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whole of creation."71 This forthright assertion nevertheless also 
elides attention to reflexive culture as a distinct zone short of 
the ultimate ends of the person (God, mediated in religion) and 
yet not comprised within social, economic, and political struc-
tures. A Compendium description of social justice ("Social justice 
concerns ... the social, political, and economic aspects and, above 
all, the structural dimensions of problems and their respective 
solutions"72) contains no reference to culture. 
Both "social justice" and a "common good," then, are incom-
plete attributes of a "good life," of human flourishing or human 
well-being. The role of reflexive culture as opposed to the dis-
tinctly religious and eternal has been tacit rather than exten-
sively addressed in ~ constructive way. Popular culture has been 
marginalized. Small yet frequent critiques of negative features 
in contemporary cultures (materialism, relativism, consumer-
ism, and so forth) do not add up to an engagement with either 
reflexive or popular culture, or for that matter with the cultural 
dimension of social practice. 
Insofar as social justice and a common good are operative in 
a society, they embody some of that society's common mean-
ings and thereby constitute social practice in a cultural dimen-
sion. But they both share finality toward an ulterior temporal 
good that is popular and reflexive culture. As real but partial 
signs and instruments of inherently social realizations of human 
dignity, they have an immanent tendency toward facilitating that 
further cultural dimension. If that finality can be conveyed in 
the language of social justice and the common good, then well 
and good; explanation of those terms in their intrinsic orienta-
tion beyond themselves in culture will suffice. But if not, then 
they may need revision or conceptual genetic engineering like 
that occurring in altering Aquinas's general justice so it became 
social justice. 
Again thankfully, CST has borne constant witness to a vision 
of humanity, a theological anthropology not confined to social, 
economic, and political capacities, activities, and structures, and 
in so doing conceives social, economic, and political realities in 
reference to a human meaning, a "transcendental humanism" 
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(Populorum Progressio, no. 16; Caritos in Veritate, no. 18) both 
open to God and possessed of its own kind of human transcen-
dence. Catholic personalism permeates CST. Clarity on the sig-
nificance of the person individually and in social existence has 
led to CST arranging in right order relations among immanent 
social, political, and economic structures. 
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